



Much of the academic and policy literature on performance related pay focuses on its role as 
an incentive system.  Its role as means for renegotiating performance norms has been largely 
neglected.  The introduction of performance related pay, based mostly on appraisals by line 
managers, in the British public services in the 1990s can be considered as a large-scale social 
experiment in the change from a seniority - to a performance-based payment system.  When 
reviewing academic research and management inside information on the schemes, a recent 
government report concluded that they had failed to motivate staff and their operation had 
been divisive.  Nevertheless, other information suggests that productivity rose.  This article 
seeks to resolve the paradox by showing that performance pay was the instrument of a major 
renegotiation of productivity norms, and that this rather than motivation was the key story.  It 
concludes that when analysing incentive systems, more attention needs to be given to contract 
theory, and in particular to the articulation of different levels of principal-agent relationships 
within organisations.  The key to the rise in productivity in the British public services lay in 
how the appraisal activities by line managers were articulated with incentives and goal setting 
for the different levels of organisational performance in order to secure the passage to 
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The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council1.   Introduction and Outline of the Argument 
 
In the public policy debate it has been common to associate the introduction of performance 
related pay (PRP) with the aim of improving incentives and motivation among public 
employees (Brown and Heywood, 2002).  This has been a key element in government and top 
management thinking in the British public services, echoed in two recent government reports 
(Bichard, 1999; Makinson, 2000), and is strongly echoed in the work of the OECD’s public 
management reform programme (Maguire, 1993; OECD, 2001; 2002).  It is also a recurrent 
theme in much of the Personnel Economics and Human Resource Management literature (e.g. 
Lazear, 1998; Milkovich and Wigdor, 1991; Mitchell et al., 1990; Armstrong and Murlis, 
1994).  From the late 1980s, the British public services embarked upon one of the most 
systematic and sustained policies of extending and developing performance related pay of 
any OECD country, mostly replacing annual seniority-related pay increments with 
performance-related increments based on goal setting and appraisals by line-managers, 
sometimes called ‘appraisal-related pay’.  The perseverance of top public management and of 
successive governments is hard to understand if employee motivation is the main story.  The 
Makinson report, which drew on both academic research findings and inside management 
information, concluded that performance pay had not motivated public employees in Britain, 
and its operation had been divisive.  Given that the policy has been sustained by three 
successive prime ministers of quite different political persuasion, two Conservative and one 
Labour, and similarly among top managers, it is hard to believe its continued use can be 
explained by political dogma.  We need to look elsewhere for an explanation. 
  That alternative explanation lies in the role of performance pay, and of performance 
management more widely, in providing a framework for the renegotiation of performance 
standards among public employees.  The idea is most simply expressed in terms of contract 
theory.  A worker and a firm agree the terms of their exchange when the worker is hired.  A 
key feature of the employment contract is that it is open-ended in terms of both its duration 
and its content.  Workers agree to give the employer’s agent - management, some flexibility 
to adapt that content to changing demands, but only within certain limits (Coase, 1937).  
From time to time, it becomes necessary to revise these limits.  This becomes an occasion for 
renegotiation.  This time, however, each party has made investments in the relationship and is 
vulnerable to pressure tactics from the other.  Much of the contract literature has emphasised 
pay because of changes in the market valuation of employee output (Malcomson, 1997).    2 
Less visible, but just as important for management, is the ability to revise job boundaries, and 
to redefine the kinds of performance it requires from employees.  This need for renegotiation 
is recognised by labour law.  For example, under English law it has to be by mutual 
agreement, whereas US law gives the employer more scope to act unilaterally, ‘at will’, 
although in practice, many US employers commonly act by mutual agreement (Malcomson, 
1997). 
  In their advocacy of corporatism as a basis for orderly renegotiation, Teulings and 
Hartog (1998) focus mainly on pay.  However, pay rules are codified and can be administered 
some distance from the place of work.  In contrast, the very flexibility of job contents that 
makes the employment relationship so useful to employers means that a large part of any job 
remains uncodified.  Job classifications introduce a degree of order, but in Williamson’s 
(1975) terms, much of the job content remains ‘idiosyncratic’ and uncodified, accessible to 
higher management only through the eyes of first-line managers.  To change performance 
norms, therefore, top management must engage in a much deeper process throughout their 
organisations, and place a major responsibility on line managers for their renegotiation with 
the groups of employees they supervise. 
  The argument I wish to develop in this paper is that performance pay, and more 
widely, performance management, played a key role in this process of renegotiating job-level 
performance in the British public services, and there is every reason to believe a similar 
process occurs elsewhere with performance pay.  The incentive and goal setting features of 
performance pay played a key part, but motivation was only their secondary function.  Their 
primary function was, through the appraisal and goal-setting process, to enable management 
to redefine performance norms in their organisation, and then to operate them effectively, and 
with the explicit or tacit agreement of as many employees as possible.  This argument 
resolves a paradox that has run through the research on performance pay in the British public 
services: the various schemes appear to have reduced motivation, as the Makinson  report 
observed, but to have benefited productivity, hence the perseverance of top management and 
successive governments.  There would of course be no paradox if the employees had 
narrowly defined jobs and tight supervision, but this is not the case for much public service 
employment.  Because so little has been written about renegotiation in the context of 
performance pay, it is useful to consider an example adapted from the author’s fieldwork, to 
give a feel for how it can work (Box 1). 
   3 
Box 1.  An example of the use of performance pay to induce more flexible working 
In many organisations, it has long been common to regulate the supply of hours from current 
employees by the system of paying overtime and weekend hours at premium rates.  This 
gives the employer flexibility, but it also protects employees against unreasonable variation 
in their workloads.  It is an example of one of the limits within which the right to manage 
operates.  Overtime rules are clear and unambiguous, and can be easily enforced even in low-
trust work environments.  Despite their simplicity, it is increasingly common for them to 
conflict with modern patterns of team working, especially when different groups of 
employees have different pay and working time preferences.  This was a problem in one of 
the hospitals in this study which wanted to introduce more flexible, patient-centred, care 
teams.  The administrative problems of different pay rates for different hours, and the desire 
of some employees for long hours in order to get higher pay, made it difficult to operate such 
teams and to ensure the availability of the desired mix of skills. 
  One solution for management is to replace the overtime and unsocial hours payments 
with performance pay in which the willingness to work flexible hours is one of the criteria of 
good performance.  Figure 1, adapted from the standard analysis of overtime working (e.g. 
Hamermesh and Rees, 1993), compares the two pay systems.  The hourly rate of pay for 
normal hours and overtime hours is shown by the line AED, the slope increasing after 40 
hours to reflect the enhanced overtime rate of pay.  With performance pay, the hours shown 
represent average hours over a certain period, say one month, and the kinked wage schedule 
is replaced by two pay schedules: one including and the other excluding performance pay, 
respectively AD and AB. 
  Line managers can now back up their requests for extra hours with the offer of good 
appraisals for cooperative working, and sanction lack of cooperation with bad appraisals and 
no performance pay.  The indifference curves show that the median employee is better off 
with higher average (flexible) hours and performance pay.  So one could say, that the 
introduction of performance pay has been used to negotiate the new, more patient-oriented, 
working patterns that management wanted.  In terms of the output that management values, 
productivity has risen.  Depending on the savings from overtime payments and the efficiency 
gains, the employer might be better off.  The median employee may accept the new norm, 
finding it financially worthwhile without finding it motivating.  The greater the variation of 
employee preferences around the median, the more likely is discontent and loss of 
motivation.   4 
  How successfully performance pay and appraisal achieves the new working patterns 
depends heavily on how effectively it is operated by line managers.  Although there is 
evidence that line manager appraisals can reflect actual performance (Boswell and Boudreau, 
2000), it is not a foregone conclusion.  In the famous case of one British car manufacturer in 
the 1970s, the introduction of ‘Measured Day Work’ became known on the shop floor as 
‘Leisure Day Work’ because line managers lost control of performance, and productivity 
crashed.  In the current example, the flexibility of the new system contains an element of 
vagueness: individual employees are not expected to provide the extra hours on every 
occasion, but to show goodwill when they are asked.  In appraisals, line managers have to 
judge whether or not goodwill has been shown.  Their judgement can be contested by their 
staff so that leniency gives them a quiet life.  Hence the degree of support line managers 
receive from higher management will determine whether the performance pay and appraisal 
encourages and reflects actual changes in performance or whether it is just a fiction. 
 
  The analysis in this article advances in three stages.  First, it reworks the data 
collected by Marsden and Richardson  (1992; 1994) and Marsden and French (1998) in a 
series of attitude surveys across a range of public services on employee and line-manager 
judgements as to the effects of performance pay.  These were also among the evidence 
considered by Makinson (2000).  They show that only a rather small minority appreciated the 
incentive effects of their performance pay schemes, and that many found them divisive.  
However, they also showed that a substantial minority of line managers thought performance 
pay had raised productivity.  Using individual employees’ performance appraisal scores as 
measures of their performance, it is shown that the performance pay and appraisal systems 
were mildly effective as an incentive, reflecting no doubt the minority who responded to 
them  favourably, but they were much more effective as a means of directing employee 
performance towards the goals management wanted.  Employees who reported that the 
appraisal process had been well-conducted, on this measure, had performed better.  The 
measure of appraisal quality was subjected to a number of methodological checks for its 
independence with regard to employees’ appraisal scores.  Thus it is established that the 
performance pay schemes could be instrumental in the renegotiation process even though 
their incentive effects were weak. 
  The second stage of the analysis sets employee goal setting and appraisal in the wider 
context of performance management for the whole organisation.  This is essential for two   5 
reasons.  As social scientists, we need to know whether performance appraisals represent 
actual performance.  Top management is in the same position, and it needs to ensure that the 
judgement exercised by line managers in appraisals tracks the kind of performance it wants 
the organisation to achieve.  Both questions can be answered simultaneously by considering 
performance management as a hierarchy of principal-agent relationships.  Line managers are 
under constant pressure from those they supervise to be generous with appraisals and 
performance pay.  The tendency for scores to drift upwards is well-known and well-
documented (Milkovich and Wigdor, 1991).  Thus top management need to ‘monitor the 
monitors’, and the different levels of performance management have to be articulated if 
performance pay and appraisal are to be used successfully to raise performance.  This section 
therefore explores the procedures top management uses to control such tendencies, and more 
important still, it examines the  behaviour of performance indicators for different 
organisational levels and their articulation.  For the latter, the analysis uses eight years’ time 
series archival data for ten administrative units within the tax service on employee 
performance appraisals, and office targets and outcomes, plus overall performance data for 
the tax service as a whole to examine how the different levels articulate.  This is done by 
considering two alternative readings of the data: the management leniency hypothesis, and the 
productivity hypothesis.  According to the first, variations in performance appraisals between 
offices are the consequence of local management leniency, and of the failure of office-level 
targets to bind on performance.  According to the second, the targets and different levels at 
which performance is measured are mutually supportive.  This judgement is based on the 
behaviour of the targets and their relationship with outcomes across offices over the eight 
years between 1993 and 2000.  It is shown that the productivity hypothesis gives the better 
account of the two. 
  The third stage of the argument explains how the productivity hypothesis is related to 
the evidence of demotivation and divisiveness.  It is argued that appraisal and goal setting 
have two faces: one in which targets are agreed, and one in which they are accepted under 
duress.  This fits with the renegotiation argument because many incumbent employees did not 
want to change.  For example, some may have found the previous performance norms fitted 
better around their non-work and domestic commitments.  The two hospitals in the study 
dealt with this problem by making transition to the new pay scheme voluntary for current 
employees, but compulsory for new hires and those who are promoted. 
  The overall strategy of the argument is to infer renegotiation from the data rather than 
rely upon interpreting management communications to staff about the purpose of   6 
performance management.  In fact, in the tax service, the scheme espoused what it called a 
‘contractual approach’ of agreeing targets, appraising against them, and linking them to wider 
organisation objective of continuous improvement (Inland Revenue, 1994, 1995).  However, 
it is clear from the survey replies that one cannot assume the scheme worked this way in 
practice.  This can only be judged from the data reviewed here. 
 
 
2.  The Evidence on Motivation and Divisiveness of Performance Pay 
 
Some details of the disenchantment observed by Makinson (2000) are captured in Table 1, 
the employee replies to attitude surveys by Marsden and Richardson (1992, 1994) and 
Marsden and French (1998).  These relate to six areas of public service work: the Inland 
Revenue in 1991 and 1996 (taxation); the Employment Service (job placement and benefit 
payments); two National Health Service trust hospitals; and head teachers in primary and 
secondary schools (elementary and high schools).  These were chosen to represent a cross-
section of public organisations using performance pay at the time.  Methodological details are 
given in the appendix, and the 1991 and 1998 publications can be obtained online from 
www.cep.lse.ac.uk ).  In brief, postal questionnaires asked about employee and line manager 
personal experiences with the operation of their performance pay and appraisal scheme in 
their service, their views as to whether it provided them with an incentive to perform in 
specific ways, whether their jobs gave them scope to do so, their judgements as to how 
management operated their scheme, and some biographical data.  Many of the motivational 
questions were modelled on expectancy theory.  In some cases, management gave their 
support and it was possible to survey a sample of all employees covered by the scheme in 
their organisation.  In others, management refused access for the survey work, although they 
did provide other information, and we had to rely on the unions to provide us with a sample 
frame based on their membership lists.  They all had high membership rates.
1  In the 
organisations where management cooperated, we were able to check whether union 
membership affected the replies, and it appeared to have no great influence. 
  The findings are broadly consistent with the results of other attitudinal surveys that 
applied the same methodology as that used by Marsden and Richardson (1992), notably,   7 
Thompson (1993), Kessler and Purcell (1993), Heery (1998), IRS (1999), and in the private 
sector, Carroll (1993).  Despite broad support for the principle of linking pay to performance, 
only a small percentage of employees thought their existing performance pay schemes 
provided them with an incentive to work beyond job requirements or to take more initiative.  
Of even more concern to top public management, was the evidence that the performance pay 
schemes in place were seen by staff to be divisive and to undermine cooperation among staff, 
and a worrying percentage of line managers reported that the schemes had made staff less 
willing to cooperate with management. 
  This cannot be explained by a naïve design of the schemes, summarised i n the 
methods appendix (Table A1).  With the possible exception of the scheme in force in the tax 
service in 1991, which was one of the first in operation, all of the schemes obeyed the canons 
of good HR practice (as set out for example by ACAS, 1990 and Armstrong and Murlis, 
1994) and had been developed with substantial inputs from private sector expertise.  They 
were seriously thought-out schemes.  With the knowledge that ratings often drift upwards, 
and that their application can be discriminatory, all the schemes incorporated substantial 
review mechanisms, and shared information with the relevant unions on the distribution of 
ratings across different categories of staff and workplaces.  Reflecting the degree of task 
complexity in many public service jobs, all the individual schemes involved performance 
appraisals by line-managers based on a mixture of judgement and recorded data.  Written 
records were kept of appraisals.  Nor was the financial incentive negligible.  Up to the top of 
the pay scale for a person’s grade, they replaced annual salary increments, and were 
consolidated into basic pay, and several years’ of good performance could lead to 
substantially faster pay progression.  For those who would previously have ‘topped out’ at the 
maximum for their grade, PRP brought the opportunity of non-consolidated annual bonuses 
in some organisations, and of further progression in others. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
1. It was 90% in the Inland Revenue, 60% in the Employment Service middle management 
grades studied, and around 90% among head teachers.    Public hospitals are also highly 
unionised. 8 
2.   The Instrumentality of Performance Management i n Renegotiating 
Performance Norms 
 
All the attitudinal surveys cited by Makinson investigated schemes that covered practically 
all the employees in certain grades in their organisations so the scope for comparing 
appraisals and their outcomes for covered and non-covered employees was severely limited.  
Therefore, the strategy adopted here is to explore whether key features of the performance 
pay and appraisal schemes were functioning in a way that would promote changed 
performance.  This section looks at two main routes through which such effects could take 
place: through employee perceptions of incentive and divisiveness, and through direct effects 
of effective appraisals on performance.  These channels are shown in Figure 2. 
 
2.1  Impact of appraisal on perceived incentive and divisiveness 
 
The choice of variables in this analysis is based on the three dominant theoretical approaches 
to the study of performance pay: agency, expectancy, and goal setting theory.  To varying 
degrees, they all stress the importance of employee choice over effort levels, and hence of 
motivation in determining their willingness to perform.  This choice is influenced by the 
rewards that flow from good performance, and by the manner and effectiveness with which 
performance goals are set. 
  Agency theory stresses the role of performance and output incentives as a means of 
encouraging employees to work hard (and not to ‘shirk’) when management find it costly to 
monitor their effort closely.  Management can act in two ways: it can tie pay to output in 
some way so as to induce employees to choose a higher level of effort (Lazear, 1995, Ch. 2).  
It can also invest in better systems of work design and performance measurement to improve 
the correlation between effort and measures of performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992:  
226).  Agency theory also warns against the dysfunctions of inappropriate incentives, for 
example, that individual incentives may encourage employees to boost their own 
performance at the expense of cooperation with their colleagues (Drago and Garvey, 1998).
2  
This trade-off suggests we need to consider both incentive and divisiveness effects of 
individual PRP schemes. 
                                                 
2. Strictly speaking, their evidence relates to promotion.   9 
  Expectancy theory, associated for example with Vroom (1964), Porter and Lawler 
(1968), Lawler (1971, Ch. 6), and Furnham (1997), like agency theory, treats employees as 
having a degree of choice and places a strong emphasis on the motivational effects of 
incentives, and the problems posed by poorly defined targets.  Simplifying somewhat, it 
identifies a potentially virtuous circle.  Employees will respond to the incentive or reward on 
offer if they value it (its valence), if they believe good performance will be instrumental in 
bringing the desired reward (instrumentality), and if they expect their efforts will achieve the 
desired performance (expectancy).  The circle of Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy can be 
broken at a number of points.  Employees may feel they lack scope to increase their effort, or 
that their effort will make little difference to their performance, such as might arise if they are 
given inappropriate work targets by management.  This undermines expectancy.  They may 
believe that management lacks the competence or the good faith to evaluate and reward their 
performance fairly, which undermines instrumentality, and may cause employees to view the 
schemes as unfair and divisive. 
  Goal setting t heory, although placing less emphasis on rewards, stresses the 
motivating power of defining appropriate work goals and engaging employee commitment to 
them (Locke and Latham, 1990; Latham and Lee, 1986; Brown and Latham, 2000).  Of 
special relevance in the current context, is the emphasis on dialogue between line-managers 
and employees to exchange information about realistic goals, and on agreeing goals so that 
employees adopt them as their own.  Thus, although the three approaches differ in emphasis, 
they point to the same key variables for the analysis of performance pay systems: reward and 
motivation on the one hand, and goal definition and evaluation on the other.  Being 
concerned with negotiation at the level of individual employees in this case, contract theory 
comes closest to goal setting theory, placing the primary emphasis on the goal setting and 
appraisal functions of PRP as a means of communicating the new performance norms to 
employees, and securing their acceptance. 
  A simple, informal model of t he key relationships, and their signs, may be 
summarised as follows: 
 
Perceived incentive (+) = f(effective appraisal (+), clear target setting (+), scope for 
employees to boost performance (+), financial incentive (+), (control variables)) 
 
Perceived divisiveness (+) = f(effective appraisal (-), clear targets (-), scope for employees to 
boost performance (-), (control variables))   10 
The questions relating to ‘perceived incentive’ in Table 1 were chosen to represent aspects of 
these incentive theories.  The first two questions capture the perceived disutility or cost to the 
employee of effort required to gain the reward: willingness to work beyond job requirements, 
and to take more initiative in order to get PRP.  The one entails more effort; the other, more 
risk of failure.  The third question captures the element of perceived reward for good work as 
opposed to ‘shirking’.  This measure of perceived incentive is close to that of valence of 
rewards in expectancy theory: are the rewards sufficiently valued to warrant the extra effort? 
  The downside, ‘perceived divisiveness’, is explored by three questions chosen to 
capture the disutility of poorer work relations, and also that of diminished cooperation that 
may jeopardise the achievement of work targets.  If staff are less willing to help their 
colleagues, the risk of failure to achieve targets is individualised, and the safety net of helping 
hands is removed.  Likewise, should the pay system cause jealousies.  Reduced willingness to 
cooperate with management captures the vertical as opposed to the horizontal aspects of 
cooperation among work colleagues.  The indices of perceived incentive and divisiveness 
were computed simultaneously using factor analysis based on these questions. 
  The key independent variable, the quality of the appraisal process (‘effective 
appraisal’), plays a key part in both agency and expectancy theory.  This is built up from 
three questions: does an employee know what she needs to do to get a good appraisal; is she 
able to do it; and does she understand her last appraisal rating.  These questions were 
validated against a more concrete, descriptive, set of questions about the appraisal process 
used in one of the hospitals in the study, and which were very unlikely to be coloured by 
whether or not the employee got a good rating (see methods appendix).  For clarity of target 
setting in PRP just one question could be matched across the organisations: did PRP lead 
managers to set targets more clearly.  This was supplemented by a question to line managers 
in the same office on the scope employees have to raise their performance.  The results in 
Table 2 show that having an effective appraisal increased employees’ perceived incentive and 
reduced perceived divisiveness.  The same is true of improved target setting.  As anticipated, 
lack of scope to improve performance increases perceived divisiveness, although the effect 
on incentive is barely significant. 
  Financial incentive could not be measured directly because good appraisals trigger 
performance pay, and later appraisal scores are used as a measure of employee performance.  
However, its presence can be measured indirectly in two ways.  On the one hand, those on the 
top of the pay scale for their grade get one-off bonuses instead of an increase in their basic 
salary.  One would expect such employees to feel less incentive than the others.  On the other,   11 
those who were both of long service and on their grade maximum would remember the 
former pay system of about 3-4 years before, with its ceilings on pay whereas those more 
recently recruited would not.  Thus, an additional measure of the presence of financial 
incentive from PRP can be found by interacting employees’ being on their grade maximum 
with their length of service.  The results show that being on the top of one’s pay scale 
diminishes perceived incentive, whereas the positive interaction with length of service 
indicates that longer serving employees are conscious of the improvement compared with the 
previous age-incremental pay system. 
  Affective commitment, as measured by Meyer and Allen (1997), provides an indirect 
proxy for ‘shirking’ behaviour, which is otherwise difficult to explore in a questionnaire 
survey to the individuals concerned.  Individual shirking is bad for the employer and usually 
bad also for one’s work colleagues as it usually disrupts their work and adds to their 
workload.  In contrast, commitment, and especially affective commitment, implies a degree 
of emotional identification with one’s workplace, and one’s work colleagues.  It was included 
because it was thought that commitment might be strong among public employees, many of 
whom have quite long service.  In the regression, commitment enhanced the perceived 
incentive of PRP and reduced its perceived divisiveness. 
  The analysis in Table 2 also includes a number of organisational and demographic 
controls.  Organisation dummies are used to control for fixed effects arising from differences 
in the schemes in operation in each organisation, the most notable being variations in the 
share of employees getting performance pay owing to differences in the design of their 
schemes.  Occupational controls were used, comparing each occupational group to managers, 
the one occupation that could be clearly identified across all the organisations.  ‘Occupation’ 
captures many possible effects, but one notable one is that the clerical and service 
occupations generally have less control over the detail of their work than do managers, and 
professionals, and hence less scope to respond to performance pay incentives.  On the other 
hand, the simpler nature of their tasks may make their performance easier to evaluate.  Both 
effects seem to be present in Table 2: the lower down the hierarchy, the stronger the 
perceived incentive of PRP, but also the stronger t he perceived divisiveness.  For 
divisiveness, professionals are the exception, possibly because they have long been 
accustomed to exercise considerable discretion in their work and so resent the extra 
management control that comes with performance management.  Length of service and 
gender are introduced as additional demographic controls.  Long service employees may be 
generally more resistant to change having invested more in the former pay systems, and this   12 
appears to be the case in Table 2, but the coefficients are small.  One might expect men to be 
more responsive to individual performance rewards than women, but in this sample, the 
effects of gender appear to be weak or non-significant. 
  Finally, the coefficient for the group PRP scheme hospital deserves comment.  It 
shows that the group scheme was considerably less divisive than the individual PRP schemes 
used in the other organisations.
3  This supports the argument of Drago and Garvey (1998) that 
strong individual incentives may diminish helping behaviour among colleagues if this gets in 
the way of individual targets. 
  Thus, a first conclusion is that the performance pay and appraisal schemes were 
actively influencing employee motivation, and that they did so in the manner the main 
theories predict.   
 
2.2  The impact of perceived incentive and divisiveness on appraised performance 
 
To be instrumental in renegotiating performance, the performance pay and appraisal schemes 
need to reach beyond motivation to influence the performance of individual staff.  Because of 
the need for line manager judgement, the researcher, like top management, is dependent on 
appraisal scores for a measure of individual performance.  This section seeks to show that 
appraised performance was better when motivation was better and when the process of 
appraisal was conducted well.  The section after, on organisational performance, completes 
the argument by linking appraised to actual performance. 
  Employees reported their latest appraisal score in the attitude surveys.  It is likely that 
they remembered these accurately because they affected their pay directly.  To judge by the 
close match between the distributions of appraisal scores in the sample surveys and in the 
archival data, respondents also reported them accurately, and there was no significant 
response bias by appraisal scores.  Because performance was graded differently across the 
schemes, outcomes were classified into ‘superior’ and ‘acceptable’, the latter including both 
satisfactory and the very small number of unsatisfactory ratings.  The performance variable is 
therefore a binary one, and a logit regression was used (Table 3).  The analyses regress 
employee performance first on perceived incentive and divisiveness plus the same batch of 
controls used earlier, then on appraisal effectiveness, and finally on all three combined in 
order to measure the interactions.  Mostly, the latter are not significant.   13 
  The logistic regression in Table 3 examines variants of the following relationship: 
 
Appraised performance level (+) = f(perceived incentive (+), perceived divisiveness(-), 
appraisal quality (+), interactions, control variables) 
 
Table 3 shows quite clearly that incentive and divisiveness do affect individual performance.  
The effect of the first is positive and of the second is n egative, and both are strongly 
significant (equations 1 and 3).  As an approximate guide, given the crude nature of the Likert 
scales, one can say that a one standard deviation increase in perceived incentive would raise 
the probability of ‘superior performance’ by about 0.6 and a similar increase in perceived 
divisiveness would reduce it by about 0.4.
4  The strong coefficient for effective appraisal 
(equations 2 and 3) deserves comment: it implies that a standard deviation increase in 
effectiveness of appraisal would lead roughly to a 0.7 increase in the probability of superior 
performance (equation 2).  The robustness of this coefficient in both equations 2 and 3 
indicates that there is also a direct effect of appraisal on performance.  In other words, 
effective appraisal can raise performance directly, independently of its effects mediated 
through motivation, as shown in Figure 2. 
  It is possible that the performance appraisal scores of individual employees might 
colour their reporting of the quality of their appraisal process and the measures of perceived 
incentive and divisivenes.  Although a recent study found that appraisal scores had little 
influence on perceptions of the appraisal process, this may depend on how it is operated in 
different organisations (Boswell and Boudreau, 2000).  This can be checked further in two 
ways.  The first test, discussed in the previous section, was to use the richer descriptive data 
collected on the appraisal process in the two hospitals and show they also correlated well 
with the measures of effective appraisal.  Second, a two-stage least squares regression was 
run.  This sought to predict, respectively, perceived incentive and perceived divisiveness 
from the effective appraisal variable shown in Table 2, and then, using the predicted values of 
incentive and divisiveness, to predict performance appraisal scores.  These had the correct 
                                                                                                                                                        
3. The individual trust hospital was not included in the regression because the pay system did 
not operate scale maxima and so absence of that variable excluded data from that hospital. 
4 The standard deviation of both perceived incentive and perceived divisiveness is 1.0.  The 
logistic regressions estimates the change in the log of the odds of achieving superior 
performance associated with a unit change in a given independent variable, that is log(p/(1-
p)), where p is the probability of the event, i.e. achieving superior performance.  With a   14 
signs and were highly significant, and so confirm that even though there may be some 
perceptual bias caused by the employee’s appraisal score, it was not such as to undermine the 
model proposed here (details in the methods appendix). 
  Thus, the attitudinal survey data so far confirm that employees who experienced well-
operated objective setting and appraisal with their managers are likely to find their scheme 
motivating, whereas those who experienced the opposite find their PRP schemes 
demotivating and damaging to work relations, and that this had the predicted effect on 
individual appraised performance.  Equally important was the strong direct influence of well-
conducted appraisal on appraised performance. 
 
 
3.   Individual and Organisational Performance:  Management Leniency 
or Productivity? 
 
So far the discussion has focused on appraised performance.  Although this presents a picture 
in which it is plausible that appraised performance tracks actual performance closely, this 
cannot be taken for granted.  The next step is to see how employee appraisals tie in with other 
measures of organisational performance. 
  It would be easy to test for a link between individual and organisational performance 
and if one could simply aggregate some physical or financial measure of output from the 
individual to the organisational level
5.  However, this is not possible when organisations rely 
heavily on judgemental performance appraisals to measure employee performance.  Public 
service organisations are not unique in this respect.  Any organisation is likely to do this 
when its employees engage in multiple tasks whose output can be measured with varying 
degrees of difficulty (Landy and Farr, 1983; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).  To show there 
is a link between judgemental appraisals and organisational performance measures, one needs 
to assess whether the schemes in the British public services had the procedures to enable 
                                                                                                                                                        
standard deviation of 1 for both motivation variables, p = e exp(b)/(1+ e exp(b)) where b is 
the regression coefficient. 
5. The issue is not whether line managers are able to appraise actual performance accurately:  
there is other evidence that they can.  One recent study, which unusually combined line-
manager appraisals and employee productivity measures, and sought to evaluate the extent of 
rater bias, found that despite its presence, judgemental appraisals correlated strongly with 
measures of actual job performance (Elvira and Town, 2001).  Rather, it concerns how top 
management can ensure that they do.   15 
management to evaluate productive performance, and that behaviourally, this was what they 
actually did.  Did poorly performing offices improve during the operation of performance 
management, and could this be related to the operation of their targets?  To  assist the 
presentation of the evidence, this section contrasts two alternative hypotheses: that appraised 
performance scores and performance management are mostly governed by local management 
indulgency, the ‘leniency hypothesis’; and that they represent processes enhancing individual 
employee productivity, the ‘productivity hypothesis’.  A summary of the key tests is given in 
Figure 3. 
 
3.1  Procedural aspects 
 
Taking the procedural question first, did the organisations have performance appraisal 
procedures that were able to measure underlying productivity, as the productivity hypothesis 
would require?  Job classifications are a key set of procedures to support judgemental 
appraisal systems.  As Betters (1931) showed, these enable management to define and 
benchmark performance standards for employees in similarly classified jobs.  In principle, 
these establish contours of job comparability within an organisation, and thus enable 
managers to compare performance levels between employees in the same jobs, and outcomes 
for the same employee over time.  This is facilitated by the degree to which many white-
collar jobs involve the application of routines that govern day-to-day working.  For example, 
tax officials follow certain routines in checking tax returns, and health professionals apply 
certain standard diagnostic routines.  In the absence of any absolute measure of performance, 
the benchmarking supported by job classifications enables management to compare 
performance of employees in similar jobs both over time and between employees.  Job 
classifications are widely used within the public services, so this part of the infrastructure for 
performance management is in place. 
  The procedures for the administration of performance pay can also help to keep line 
managers focused on performance that is useful to the organisation, and to ensure that the 
judgemental element of their ratings is grounded in observed performance, and can be 
checked by others.  In this respect, the various schemes had been set up with a substantial 
input from outside and from the private sector, and they conformed by and large to the 
canons of good HR practice of the time, as set out for example by ACAS (1990) and 
Armstrong and Murlis (1994).  Appraisals were written, and line managers encouraged to 
give specific objectives, and the schemes had provisions enabling higher management to   16 
monitor sources of potential bias.  All appraisals were vetted by the next higher level of 
management, and information on the distribution of appraisal scores was made available to 
the unions.  Job classification again facilitates standardisation of appraisals across different 
parts of the same organisation.  In addition, a survey of tax service staff confirmed that the 
great majority had regular contact with their line managers, so the latter should be well-
informed about their work, and that line-managers spent several hours on each appraisal 
(Inland Revenue Department Whitley Council,  1991).  Moreover, because most line-
managers have been promoted ‘from the ranks’, they will know about the detail of the work 
to be undertaken.  There is therefore good reason to believe that line-managers are in a 
position to make an informed judgement about the performance of their staff in these 
organisations, and that there is a degree of internal consistency. 
  These procedures were intended to protect the organisations against drift in appraisal 
scores and in the pay bill that would be associated with line-manager leniency, and so their 
presence favours the productivity hypothesis.  However, having good procedures is a 
necessary and not a sufficient condition for management to gauge employee productivity 
effectively.  To deal with this question, we need to study the behaviour of the appraisal scores 
and other organisational performance indicators over time. 
 
3.2  Behavioural aspects 
 
Analysis of the behavioural aspects is based on indicators of organisational performance 
assembled from public accounts.  For this study, they are most complete over time and across 
internal administrative units for the tax service, although the more fragmentary data for the 
Employment Service and hospitals paint a consistent picture.
6  For the tax service, it has been 
possible to piece together an annual time series for 1993-2000 relating to the distribution of 
employee appraisal scores for each of its ten regional offices, each office’s annual 
performance targets and outcomes, and measures of performance for the organisation as a 
whole.
7 
  The measures of performance for these administrative units stem from the n ew 
performance management system introduced in the tax service in 1993.  Then, it greatly 
                                                 
6. For the pooled a nalysis across all the organisations, it is possible to identify 36 
administrative units, but not consistently over time.  The results, not shown here, are 
consistent with those for the Inland Revenue.   17 
extended its range of organisational performance indicators covering two types of measure in 
particular: quantity and quality.  The first related to the percentage of different kinds of tax 
work cleared within so many days of its reception (‘clearance’), and the second, to measures 
of quality of service, including the percentage of work that is ‘right first time’, and time taken 
to respond to tax payer queries, answer the telephone and so on (‘quality’) (see methods 
appendix for details).  Each office is given its target at the start of the annual cycle, and its 
performance against that is measured at the end.  The tax service’s Internal Auditor verifies 
the published outcomes in its annual report and accounts which are laid before Parliament.  
For this analysis, the annual mean value was computed across the ‘clearance’ and the 
‘quality’ targets for each office, and likewise for their attainment.  The clearance and quality 
‘gaps’ are measured by subtracting target from achieved performance so that a shortfall has a 
negative sign, and an overshoot, a positive one.  Overall organisational performance is 
measured by real tax revenues per employee: a measure of organisational workload.  When 
economic growth picks up, not only do tax revenues rise from current tax payers, but 
employment rises, thus increasing the number of taxpayers and of tax transactions.  Rising 
business activity will also increase the number and complexity of tax transactions.  The 
measure used here is consistent with another one published by the tax service: the audited 
cost of collection as a percentage of tax yield.  This fell every year from 1993 to 2000, from 
2.14% to 1.11% (Board of Inland Revenue, 2001). 
  These archival data are used to analyse office performance with three main questions 
in mind.  Did poorly performing offices improve over time as the productivity hypothesis 
would require?  Were targets used in such a way as to promote this process?  Did the 
proportion of good employee appraisals correspond to lenient management handing them out 
to buy peace, or did they appear to be used to mobilise greater effort?  Finally, did the 
increased demand for taxation services brought about by economic growth translate into 
increased pressure for recruitment and increased delays, or did it translate into higher 
productivity? 
  According to the productivity hypothesis, top management will use performance 
indicators to raise the performance of the poorest performing offices, and spread good 
practice from the best ones.  This is indeed what the government’s Audit Commission (1999) 
recommends, and has been practiced by the Inland Revenue for many years (NAO, 1989).  In 
contrast, the leniency hypothesis would predict that performance problems in poorly managed 
                                                                                                                                                        
7. These data were mostly not published, but were shared between management the unions as   18 
offices would be left to fester, and there would be persistence both at the top and the bottom 
ends of the performance league table of Inland Revenue offices.  The best of the easily 
available measures of office performance are the targets set to each office by top 
management.  If the productivity hypothesis is true, then these will be informed by the best 
information available to top management at the time.  If that hypothesis is true, then the best-
run offices will have the most demanding targets in any year.  Because good practice is 
shared, they will lose their position at the top, but they will do so gradually.  It takes time to 
effect the organisational changes needed to help other offices to improve.  There will 
therefore be a gradual regression towards the mean.  If the leniency hypothesis is true, then 
there will either be persistence at the top and at the bottom of the league table, as poorly 
performing offices are left to their own devices, or there will be unsystematic fluctuations as 
the targets reflect the vagaries of bargaining relationships between office and top 
management.  The first two columns of Table 4 show there is indeed gradual improvement by 
the weakest performing offices, and a gradual loss of lead by the best performing ones over 
one or two years, as correlations with the initial year decline in each successive year. 
  A second indicator of whether office targets are being used actively by top 
management relates to how they are revised each year.  As with the levels of performance 
indicators, year-to-year adjustment of targets in the light of our achieved outcomes shows that 
top management are using targets to steer office performance.  If there is an overshoot, then 
top management will revise the target upwards, and if there are good reasons for a shortfall 
on targets, it can revise them downwards, the aim always being, in line with goal-setting 
theory, to keep targets achievable but stretching.  If top management knows there is a local 
problem, it makes more sense to allow time for it to be addressed, and maintain the integrity 
of the targets rather than adjust them fully and immediately.  Thus adjustment in this sense is 
consistent with short-term persistence of over- or under-shooting, but not extending into the 
medium or longer term.  If the leniency hypothesis were true, then one would expect no such 
active management of targets as offices would be allowed to undershoot or overshoot 
persistently.  The middle columns of Table 4 show that the ‘clearance’ and ‘quality’ gaps of 
individual offices are gradually eliminated. 
  The percentage of staff in an office achieving superior performance can be analysed 
in a similar fashion.  The leniency hypothesis predicts that poorly managed offices will be 
persistently over-generous with appraisals as they try to buy peace as they struggle with poor 
                                                                                                                                                        
part of the joint monitoring of the performance pay scheme.   19 
organisation and bad employee relations.  In similar vein to the preceding indicators, it might 
also be consistent with lots of year-to-year variation as managers spend their time ‘fire-
fighting’.  In contrast, the productivity hypothesis predicts again a limited degree of year-to-
year persistence because the problems that local management seek to address in pushing their 
staff to superior performance on that scale are likely to be quite serious.  There were two 
mechanisms by which management could use their scheme to this end.  They could indicate 
to their staff that the additional performance they were seeking would be recognised when it 
came to their appraisals, and they could use the special provisions for posts that have above 
average demands, called ‘extra loaded’ posts, and which also count towards achieving 
superior performance.  The last column of Table 4 confirms the pattern predicted by the 
productivity hypothesis. 
  The relationships among the performance indicators paint a similar picture in Table 5 
which shows correlations for selected indicators pooled over time and between offices.  Top 
management’s active use of targets is confirmed by the correlation between changes in 
clearance and quality targets and the previous year’s achievements.  They adjust the targets 
for the coming year in the light of the additional information from outcomes in the year just 
ended.  At first reading, the negative correlation between the percentage of employees 
achieving superior performance in an office and the degree of under- or over-shoot on targets 
seems to point towards the leniency hypothesis: management are over-generous with good 
appraisals and so fail to achieve their office targets.  However, if this were true, then there 
would be a high degree of persistence in bad and good office performance, contrary to what 
was shown in Table 4.  The alternative explanation, from the productivity hypothesis, is that 
as management know they are under pressure to achieve their targets, they use performance 
management to mobilise the extra effort and quality needed to reach them.  The anticipated 
shortfall in this case is an indicator of the pressure on the office. 
  Finally, there is the background of rising workload and productivity in the Inland 
Revenue throughout the period of performance management (Table 5 and Chart 1).  As 
argued earlier, rising tax revenues associated with economic growth are a proxy for 
increasing workload brought by economic growth.  Under the  leniency hypothesis, 
management would be faced with pressures from staff and unions to increase recruitment, 
and there would be increased delays in dealing citizens’ tax affairs, and in the collection of 
tax revenues as tax staff held their level of effort constant.  The data in Chart 1 show this did 
not happen.  Hiring was held down and employment fell from 1993-1998.  Clearance targets 
were adjusted downwards only slightly and quality targets were actually raised slightly.    20 
Moreover, the shortfall on targets was kept under tight control.  This was reflected in the 
correlation between the percentage of employees with superior performance and overall 
productivity.  Nor was this achieved by accident.  With the knowledge from the 
macroeconomic forecasts used to predict government tax revenues, top management could 
easily anticipate that workload would increase.  Given its control over targets and their 
implementation, it seems quite clear that it was able to use them to translate the increased 
workload into increased efficiency, a point stressed in successive issues of its Report and 
Accounts.  This argues clearly in favour of the  productivity hypothesis  and against the 
leniency hypothesis. 
  How did management succeed in  persuading employees to provide the extra 
performance?  The tax service, like much of the public service is highly unionised, and due 
process applies to all dismissals, so management cannot just bludgeon employees into 
compliance with threats of dismissal.  The answer lies in the decline in basic salaries in the 
tax service, excluding performance pay, compared with average white-collar pay in the 
economy (‘relative basic salary’ in Chart 1).  This shows the penalty facing employees who 
refused to aim for satisfactory performance under the new system  - echoing the options 
facing employees shown in Figure 1. 
  The performance information on the Employment Service and the two NHS trust 
hospitals is far less complete.  Nevertheless, the fragments available suggest a similar picture 
to that of the tax service.  In the ES, job placements per employee rose sharply between 1993 
and 1998, and were rising steeply in the early years of its PRP scheme (Employment Service, 
1997).  Using the indicators from the NHS Performance Guide (NHS Executive, 1997), it is 
possible to show that across a wide range of performance indicators, performance was 
improving greatly at the trust using individual performance pay, and to a lesser extent, as the 
one using the trust-wide bonus.  This is consistent with the reports to the sample survey by a 




4.   Productivity and De-Motivation:  the ‘Two Faces of Appraisal’ 
 
If the productivity thesis is correct, and employees did shift to new performance patterns, then 
it is natural to ask why so many of them replied that their schemes lacked incentive and were   21 
divisive in their operation.  One clue lies in the direct impact of appraisal quality on 
employee performance observed in Table 3.  One might go further to suggest that there are 
‘two faces’ of appraisal.  The appraisal interviews can give incentives by clarifying work 
goals and giving recognition when they are achieved, but they can also be a vehicle for 
management to pressurise employees into giving higher levels of performance for fear of 
losing pay or even losing their jobs.  The sample data for the tax service provide some 
evidence on this.  Respondents were asked whether staff felt pressured to accept 
management’s choice of objectives, as opposed to agreeing them, the latter being the express 
philosophy of the service’s performance management scheme (Inland Revenue, 1994).  They 
were asked whether they thought everyone was in effect given the same targets – despite the 
philosophy that targets should be adapted to what individual employees can contribute.  They 
were also asked about the negotiation of objectives:  whether those who were awarded 
superior appraisals did so because they were cleverer at negotiating their objectives; and 
whether, when agreeing their objectives, they were more concerned to avoid the risk of a bad 
appraisal than to aim for a superior performance rating.  They were also asked about how 
they thought management operated the scheme, fairly or otherwise, captured by whether or 
not they thought management applied a quota on good appraisals, and whether they used the 
scheme to reward their favourites.  Table 6 shows how these assessments are reflected in 
judgements of effective appraisal, perceived incentive, divisiveness, and achieving superior 
performance. 
  One group of employees that was particularly sensitive to feelings of duress was part-
timers, who are particularly numerous in the public sector.  Given that many of them take on 
such work in order to balance work and domestic responsibilities, this group is especially 
likely to be reluctant to agree to a new trade-off between effort and reward and hence to 
renegotiate reluctantly.  One notable feature of these results is that part-timers were twice as 
likely as full-timers to report pressure to agree targets, and they were also more likely to 
express cynical views about the other questions on appraisal in Table 6.  In other words, for 
many of these employees, what they opposed was the renegotiation of the old performance 
norms that management sought through the appraisal process. 
  The picture to emerge is that those who feel they accept work targets under duress and 
that they are appraised against targets they did not agree are more likely to find the scheme 
divisive, are less likely to report favourably on the appraisal process, and on the whole, are 
less likely to achieve superior performance.   22 
5.   Appraisal and the Re-Negotiation of Performance 
 
The final question i s what causes these feelings of performing under duress?  Is it just that 
some line managers are bad at appraisal and goal setting, and so do it in a threatening way, in 
which case, better design and more training might be the answer.  Or is it related to the 
degree of pressure from the employer to raise performance, as part of a renegotiation of 
performance levels, especially when faced with diverse employee preferences?  To answer 
this question about duress more fully, it is helpful to consider the respective positions of 
individual and collective bargaining (Table 7). 
  One can examine the intensity of re-negotiation at the individual and the collective 
levels.  For the first, one can take the degree to which application of the new scheme is 
compulsory for all employees, so that all employees have to agree work objectives and accept 
monitoring of their achievement.  Thus, in the Inland Revenue and the Employment Service, 
the schemes were universal and compulsory.  In contrast, in the two hospitals, incumbent 
employees were offered a choice between higher basic pay under the new local performance 
pay scheme, and remaining on the old nationally negotiated time-based pay scales without 
performance pay.  By doing this, the hospital management avoided conflict with some groups 
of employees which had built up considerable premium payments under the old pay system, 
for example, for weekend working.  School head teachers came in an intermediate position 
because the implementation of performance pay for them depended on the initiative of their 
school’s governors whom they could often influence.  Finally, the scheme in force at the 
Inland Revenue in 1991 was very much a hybrid between the old seniority-incremental 
system and the new performance management system.  In the words of the union negotiators, 
it was ‘bolted on’ to the old pay and appraisal system.  Thus performance pay meant 
accelerated movement up the old incremental scale.  The old performance appraisal system 
was based primarily on performance against a uniform set of criteria, with little reference to 
targets.  The scheme had carrots but no sticks. 
  Collective bargaining has played a somewhat smaller role because it cannot do much 
more than set up a framework and establish incentives.  The levering up of performance 
levels and the detailed reorientation of performance has to be done at the individual level 
between line managers and their staff.  Nevertheless, the two collective agreements that 
ushered in performance pay at the Inland Revenue were conflictual.  The 1988 agreement 
was obtained with a management threat that if performance pay were not included, there   23 
would be no national agreement, and the 1993 agreement was preceded by a bitter strike 
despite early working parties on pay reform.  The hospitals h ad the least conflictual 
introduction of performance pay as it came with new provisions for local bargaining. 
  Thus, prima facie, it would seem that the pressure from management as expressed 
through the extent and intensity of individual negotiation partially accounts for the different 
levels of perceived divisiveness in the various organisations in this study (Table 7). 
 
 
6.   Conclusion 
 
Before drawing conclusions, some possible objections need to be set aside.  The first is that 
performance pay eliminated widespread ‘shirking’ among public servants, and so naturally 
productivity would rise along with employee resentment.  This is not consistent with the 
levels of organisational commitment found, whereby the great majority of respondents (67%) 
felt a strong sense of commitment to their place of work.
8  There may have been a small 
minority of ‘shirkers’ but it does not seem large enough to explain the widespread 
disenchantment noted by Makinson (2000). 
  The second concerns Lazear’s (1998) finding that improving incentives attracted more 
productive employees, so that it would be possible that incumbent staff felt alienated while 
productivity rose as a result of the new recruits.  This is ruled out by the low levels of 
recruitment in the public services during the 1990s, and notably in the Inland Revenue where 
employment was falling. 
  The third concerns the technical and other organisational changes that were taking 
place at the same time.  Might performance management have acted simply as a ‘lightning 
conductor’ for the resulting discontent.  This possibility cannot be entirely excluded because 
such changes were taking place.  However, performance management was not just 
accidentally ‘caught in the crossfire’.  To work the new organisational patterns and to 
integrate the new technology into working practices, management had to renegotiate 
performance norms.  In the ‘care team’ overtime example given at the start, based on one of 
the hospitals in the study, performance pay was the vehicle for introducing the organisational 
change, and the means of making it operative.  Indeed, management saw it quite explicitly in 
                                                 
8. The correlation between responses to this question and the scaled measure of commitment 
was 0.736 significant at the 1% level.   24 
this way.  In the Inland Revenue’s documents to explain performance management to its 
employees, it stressed the need to modernise working methods (Inland Revenue, 1995). 
  Hence there is a real paradox.  Performance pay played an important part in the rise in 
productivity, but it did not do so in the way expected, by improving incentives and raising 
motivation.  Instead, it achieved this result because it was the framework within which 
management was able to renegotiate performance norms in major areas of the public services.  
Performance appraisals, and particularly the fixing of objectives at the start of the cycle, are 
critical.  Seen in this light, successive governments’ policies to extend performance pay do 
not need to be explained by attachment to political dogma.  Rather, they, and their top 
management teams were carrying out a successful renegotiation of performance. 
  The wider significance of this lies in two areas.  First, it has been a major social 
experiment in change of reward systems from seniority-based to performance-based annual 
pay increments affecting many thousands of employees across a wide range of service 
activities including administration, service to job seekers, health and education services.  In 
his JEL review of work on incentives, Prendergast (1999) commented on the need to extend 
the study of incentives beyond CEOs, sales and sports personnel.  In comparison with the 
public employees in the present study, these categories generally have simpler metrics for 
their output, and so have simpler principal-agent relationships.  Arguably, this gives a false 
view of the work situation in which incentives are applied to many other kinds of employees.  
In the activities covered here, top management have to rely heavily in the judgements made 
by line managers.  Although supported by objective data, their appraisals always contain an 
irreducible element of judgement, and hence, top management has t o delegate much of 
performance management to them.  There are therefore at least two levels of principal-agent 
relationship:  between line managers and those they supervise, and between top management 
and line management.  The success, particularly of the  Inland Revenue performance 
management system, lay in the articulation of performance measures for both relationships.  
The regional office targets kept up the pressure on local management teams, and these kept 
up the pressure on line managers to appraise performance realistically and to avoid leniency.  
Hence, the ‘Measured Day Work’ to ‘Leisure Day Work’ disaster of the British car industry 
was avoided. 
  The second major conclusion concerns the importance of contract theory as a 
supplement to that of incentives and motivation.  The moral hazard paradigm of effort-
minimising employees exploiting management’s inability to monitor their effort is the wrong 
model in much of the public sector.  The high levels of commitment suggest this.  More   25 
important however is that people have a view of what they agreed with their employer when 
they were hired, of what is their employment contract, and how this evolved subsequently.  
Employees who resented performance pay and found it divisive were more concerned about 
the change to their previously existing employment conditions and performance expectations.  
A more appropriate paradigm is to think of performance pay and other incentive schemes as 
being introduced in the context of already established employment relationships so that an 
element of renegotiation is always present.  The higher proportion of long-term employees in 
the public sector may make this more of an issue there, but as work by the OECD (1993, 
1997) has shown, long-term employment is a feature of all OECD economies and extends 
also to the private sector. 26 
Tables and Charts 
 
Table 1:  Replies to employee attitude surveys in selected public service organisations 






Question: % in each cell replying 

















Pay and work orientations               
PP a good principle  57  58  72  62  52  29  42 
Motivation: perceived incentive               
PP gives me an incentive to work 
beyond job requirements 
21  18  12  32  22  8  10 
PP gives me an incentive to show 
more initiative in my job 
27  20  20  36  19  9  11 
PP means good work is rewarded 
at last 
41  19  24  47  34  38  40 
Motivation: perceived 
divisiveness 
             
PP causes jealousies  62  86  78  61  51  58  70 
PP makes staff less willing to 
assist colleagues 
28  63  52  22  19  51  54 
PP has made me less willing to 
cooperate with management 
10  30  26  19  14  7  4 
Relations with management: 
non-manager replies: 
             
Management use PP to reward 
their favourites  
35  57  41  41  27  Na  na 
There is a quota on good 
assessments* 
74  78  74  57  36  48  45 
Line manager views:               
PP has reduced staff willingness 
to cooperate with management 
20  45  39  30  27  Na  na 
PP has increased the quantity of 
work done 
22  42  28  52  34  Na  na 
N (total replies)  2,420  1,180  290  680  900  1,050  860 
Response rate (%)  61  30  33  28  21  51  21 
Note:  based on five-point Likert scales:  ‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘no view’, ‘agree’ and ‘agree strongly’. 
NAHT:  National Association of Head Teachers (mainly primary schools); SHA:  Secondary Heads Association 
(mainly secondary schools).  For an explanation of the nature of the surveys, see the methods appendix. 
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Table 2:  Determinants of perceived incentive and divisiveness (individual employees) 





    Perceived 
divisiveness 
   








   Standardized 
Coefficients 
   B  SE  Beta  B  SE  Beta 
Operation of PRP 
schemes 
           
Effective appraisal   .195**  .020  .175**  -.213**  .019  -.194** 
Mgrs set targets more 
clearly 
.263**  .018  .250**  -.042**  .017  -.041** 
No scope to raise 
performance§ 
.124+  .085  .030+  .221**  .080  .055** 
Financial incentive             
Max on payscale  -.204**  .064  -.098**  .001  .060  .000 
Interaction: length of 
service*pay_max  
.011*  .005  .099*  -.001  .005  -.014 
Commitment             
Affective commitment   .173**  .020  .153**  -.183**  .019  -.165** 
Goal commitment   .153**  .022  .131**  .030  .021  .026 
Organisational 
controls 
           
Inland Revenue 96 
dummy 
-.022  .052  -.010  .577**  .049  .252** 
Employment Service 
dummy 
-.189+  .120  -.029+  .396**  .113  .062** 
Group trust dummy  -.085  .116  -.024  -.706**  .110  -.202** 
Occupational and 
demographic controls 
           
Professional  -.159  .153  -.034  .421**  .144  .091** 
Technician dummy  .165*  .079  .060*  .185**  .074  .068** 
Clerical dummy  .311**  .074  .140**  .262**  .070  .120** 
Service isco dummy  .475**  .193  .057**  .357*  .182  .043* 
Craft dummy  .357  .703  .009  1.020+  .663  .026+ 
Length of Service in 
Org 
-.016**  .004  -.130**  .014**  .004  .115** 
Male dummy  -.080*  .040  -.037*  .050  .037  .023 
             
(Constant)  -.978**  .282    -1.039**  .266   
             
Adjusted r2      0.203      0.264 
Sig      0.000      0.000 
N      2752      2752 
Significance levels:  ** 2%; * 5%; + 15%. 
Notes:  § Based on line manager judgement that staff in their office have no scope to improve their performance. 
Non-managers in workplaces with sample observations >19 employees.  Note that analysis excludes line 
managers in order to use their judgements of whether employees in their workplace had too little control over 
their jobs to raise or change their performance. 
Equations shown exclude head teachers, but their inclusion does not alter the main results, except for the 
occupational control variables. 
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Table 3:  Effects of perceived incentive and divisiveness on employee performance 
Logit regression:  Dependent variable: probability of achieving ‘superior’ performance 
  Eqn 1    Eqn 2   
  B  S.E.  B  S.E. 
Incentives and commitment         
Perceived incentive   .372**  .040  .273*  .135 
Percieved divisiveness   -.273**  0.45  -.275*  .136 
Operation of appraisal and target setting         
Effective appraisal      .996**  .065 
Targets set more clearly      -.149**  .050 
No scope to raise performance§      -.985**  .219 
Commitment         
Affective commitment       -.075#  .055 
Goal commitment      -.282**  .056 
Interactions         
Incentive*appraisal quality      .051  .057 
Divisiveness*appraisal quality      -.143**  .056 
Incentive*targets      .015  .044 
Divisiveness*targets      .062#  .048 
Incentive*divisiveness       .000  .048 
         
Occupational and demographic controls         
Professionals  -1.878**  .285  -1.638**  .325 
Technicians  .302+  .182  .299#  .197 
Clerical  .198  .169  .306+  .184 
Service employees  -6.968+  3.871  -6.596#  4.262 
Craft  -1.1181  .935  -1.922#  1.508 
Length of service  .021**  .005  .026**  .006 
Male (dummy)  .009  .092  -.155#  .102 
         
Organisational controls         
Inland Revenue 96  -.259**  .101  .792**  .131 
Employment Service  -2.547**  .569  -2.242**  .594 
NHS trust hospitals  .509**  .215  .826**  .249 
Schools (not included)  -  -  -  - 
         
Constant  -.883**  .198  2.038**  .722 
R2 (Cox & Snell)  .125    0.226   
R2 (Nagelkerke)  .171    0.308   
% correctly predicted  65.6    72.0   
N  2991    2819   
Note: superior performance includes ‘exceed’ and ‘succeed at extra-loaded’ jobs. 
§ Based on line manager judgement that staff in their office have no scope to improve their performance. 
** 2%; * 5%; + 10%; # 20%. 
Equations shown exclude head teachers, but their inclusion does not alter the main results, except for the 
occupational control variables. 
 
 
Table 4:  Year-to-year rank correlations by regional office for performance targets 
Mean rank correlation with 
base year (Year 0). 
Target 
clearance 
Target quality  Clearance gap  Quality gap  % of employees 
with superior 
performance 
Year 1  0.462  0.584  0.255  0.469  0.789 
Year 2  0.267  0.264  -0.099  0.365  0.507 
Year 3  0.194  0.087  -0.207  0.224  0.129 
Year 4  0.251  -0.007  0.031  0.123  -0.159 
Note: Inland Revenue, Spearman rank correlations among 10 regional offices.  29 
Table 5:  Correlations between key measures of IR performance 




% Change in 
clearance target 
at end of year 
% Change in 
quality target 
at end of year




Clearance gap (shortfall or
excess on targets) 
1.000  .264**  .641**  .338**  -.472**  -.451** 
Quality gap (shortfall or 
excess on targets) 
  1.000  .102  .277**  -.373**  -.187+ 
Change in clearance target 
at end of year % 
    1.000  .451**  -.303**  -.181# 
Change in quality target at 
end of year % 
      1.000  -.236*  -.336** 
% of employees with 
superior performance 
        1.000  .612** 
Productivity: tax 
revenues/salary bill  
          1.000 
Relative basic salaries 
 
           
N 
 
80  80  80  80  70  70 (8) 
Correlations across 10 individual offices and over 8 years. 
N=80 for clearance and quality data and N = 70 for average employee performance measures; Note also that the 
measures of output (tax revenue/salary bill, and relative basic salary have a single value for all offices in any 
given year).  Note that the productivity and relative salary data are available for the whole organization only, 
giving eight different values. 
Significance:  ** at 2% level (2-tailed), * at 5%, + at 10%, and at # 20%. 
 
 
Table 6:  Management pressure within appraisals?  Inland Revenue 1996 








OLS regressions: standardised beta 
coefficients 
       
Staff pressured to accept management’s 
performance objectives. 
-.115**  -.154**  .191**  .070+ 
Everyone is given the same targets. 
 
-.047#  -.109**  .022  -.052# 
Those getting good appraisals are cleverest at 
negotiating their performance agreements  
-.114**  -.063+  .124**  -.075* 
Agree my objectives to avoid a bad appraisal  -.211**  -.121**  .104**  -.270** 
Managers use PRP to reward their favourites   -.122**  -.050#  .354**  -.070+ 
There is a quota on good appraisals 
 
-.059#  -.117**  .095**  -.028 
N  770  758  758  741 
Adjusted R
2  .158  .142  .348  .095 
Sig  **  **  **  ** 
Note: the table includes the same occupational and demographic control variables as in Table 2. 
Significance: ** 2%, * 5%, + 10%, # 20%. 
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Role of individual 
agreement 
Role of collective agreement 
Inland Revenue 
1996 
0.472  .035  Compulsory for all  1993 pay agreement after strike 
Employment 
Service 
0.252  .061  Compulsory for all  Series of agreements for different 
staff grades 1994-95 
Schools: Head 
teachers  0.142  .060 
Compulsory if 
adopted by school 
governors 
Implemented by government after pay 
review as one criterion for pay awards 
by school governors 
Hospital with 
individual PRP 
-0.041  .066  Voluntary for current 
staff 
Implemented by local mgt; 
subsequent agreement with unions 
Inland Revenue 
1991 
-0.158  .067  Compulsory but no 
losers 
1988 pay agreement 
Hospital with 
trust-wide bonus 
-0.486  .067  Voluntary for current 
staff 
Implemented by local mgt; 
subsequent agreement with unions 
Note: mean perceived divisiveness for all organisations combined is 0, with a standard deviation of 1, and a 
mean for each organisation of between 0.9 and 1. 
The standardised means are derived using the organisational dummies and constant term based on the equations 
in Table 2, but excluding the question on line manager judgements of scope to raise performance which could 
not be asked of head teachers, and excluding that on whether someone was on the maximum for their grade 
because there was no limit on performance awards at the top of the grade for head teachers or for staff in the 
individual PRP hospital.  This makes no difference to the rank order of divisiveness by organisation, nor does 
using the raw mean calculated directly from the sample. 31 
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Relative basic salary (no PRP)




Source:  Inland Revenue Report and Accounts, (Board of Inland Revenue, various years), Economic Trends, 
Civil Service Statistics. 32 
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Figure 3:  Performance indicators under the ‘leniency’ and the ‘productivity’ 
hypotheses. 
  Leniency  Productivity 
Procedural indicators     
Job classification for 
performance 
measurement 
Not relevant  Essential 
Appraisal system checks 
& balances 
Not relevant  Essential 
Behavioural indictors     
Inter-office performance 
differences 
Persistently poor & good 
performers 
Gradual improvement of poor 
performing offices, & 
regression towards mean of 
top performers 
Achievement and 
revision of office targets  
Targets not revised because no 
one takes them seriously 
Targets adjusted in the light of 





Weak management hand out PRP 
to buy peace >> correlates with 
missed targets & persistently 
generous offices. 
Active management use PRP 
to mobilise staff for office 
targets. Correlates with 
pressure on targets but no 
persistently generous offices 
Increased demand for 
tax office services (econ 
growth) 
Increased pressure for more staff 
& increased delays in work: 
productivity static. 
Tight control of staffing, & 
performance targets 











A1  Details of Schemes and Sources 
 
  Summary details of performance pay schemes studied 
 
Table A1:  Summary details of performance pay schemes studied 
Organisation  Type of scheme  Treatment of employees at 
the top of their respective 
pay span 
Per cent of 
employees on 




Employees move up existing seniority pay 
scale faster on receipt of good appraisal by 
line manager. Appraisal against 
standardised criteria. 
Smaller % merit increases 
for higher level grades and 
limit of 3 increments above 





No seniority scales. Appraised as 
‘Succeeding’ at agreed targets brings pay 
increase, and ‘Exceeding’ brings 
additional increase, as does ‘Succeeding’ 
at jobs classified ‘extra loaded’. No 
inflation increase in some years. 
Smaller % merit payments 
as staff progress up the pay 
span for their grade, and 
restrictions on overlapping 




No seniority scales. Pay increase depends 
on achieving appraised performance 
objectives & is based on a share of a 
negotiated pot. 
Performance pay above the 
maximum for the grade is 
non-consolidated 
58.9% 
NHS hospital – 
individual PRP 
No seniority scale. Pay increase dependent 
on appraised individual performance. 
No scale max but bonus for 
above average performance 
is non-consolidated 
Not applicable 
NHS hospital – 
trust-wide 
bonus 
No seniority scale. Pay increase depends 
on trust-wide bonus, poor performers only 
excluded. 
Bonus at the grade 








Additional movement up pay spine for 
appraised excellent performance by school 
governors. No seniority increments 
No limit on additional spine 
points that may be awarded 
Not applicable 
 
All of the schemes had been in operation for about three years before they were surveyed so 
that many initial teething problems should have been overcome.  Union involvement has been 
secondary.  Management made the initial decision on the design and implementation, and 
only subsequently were the unions involved. 
 
a)  Details of the employee attitude survey 
 
Attitudinal data were collected by postal questionnaire sent to individual employees in each 
organisation.  Mostly these were completed in the e mployee’s own time.  In three 35 
organisations, management cooperated with the study, enabling lists of employees to be used 
for drawing the sample, and the internal mail for distributing and receiving back 
questionnaires.  Lacking management support for the 1996-97 surveys of the civil service 
departments and for schools, union membership lists were used, but membership density is 
very high.  It was 90% in the Inland Revenue, 60% in the Employment Service middle 
management grades studied, and around 90% among head teachers.  Public hospitals are also 
highly unionised.  Questionnaires were sent to the grades of staff organised by the Inland 
Revenue Staffs Federation, later merged into the PCS, for the tax service, and included staff 
from skilled secretary up to tax inspectors.  Other unions organised more junior and more 
senior staff, respectively, the CPSA and the First Division Association.  In the Employment 
Service, the sample included middle-management grades organised by the PCS.  In the 
hospitals, all staff were included except medical doctors who were not subject to the schemes.  
Among head teachers, a sample was drawn from all those on the unions’ membership lists. 
  Most of the attitudinal questions used 5-point Likert scales, ranging from disagree 
strongly to agree strongly.  Questions were piloted with groups of employees or where 
management cooperation was lacking, with groups of union members.  Preliminary results 
were presented to the organisations and interpretations discussed with management and 
unions in feedback seminars. 
  The questionnaires were divided into sections.  Each dealt with a specific aspect: 
general attitudes to pay and performance; employee judgements of whether or not it gave 
them an incentive, their personal experience with their most recent performance appraisal; 
and line-managers’ views of the effects of the scheme on staff.  The full text of the 
questionnaires can be found in Marsden and Richardson (1992) and Marsden and French 
(1998). 
  The average survey response rate was 43%, ranging between about 60% in the tax 
service in 1991 to about 20% in one of the hospitals (see Table 1 main text).  The 
questionnaires were long, mostly over 100 questions, imposing a considerable time burden on 
respondents. 
  Response patterns were compared with such demographic and other breakdowns as 
were available.  Response rates were higher among the more managerial occupations, but all 
occupational levels were well represented in the sample.  Response by gender and by age or 
length of service, and where asked, by ethnic background, and full- and part-time showed no 
great divergence from the organisations’ employment figures.  There was also a good 
response from across the regional offices of the tax and the employment services.  Response 36 
patterns were compared with appraisal markings and found to be very similar across 
performance ratings. 
 
b)  The archival data 
 
The development of measures of organisational performance has gone hand in hand with the 
development of performance pay and the spread of new public management methods.  The 
best data related to performance pay exist for the tax service, and there the range and 
complexity of performance indicators reported in the Annual Report and Accounts has 
improved over time.  Similar types of performance data are available for the other 
organisations, but they are less complete and less consistent over time. 
  The administrative unit measures for the tax service consist of the distribution of 
appraisal scores by regional office for each of the ten regional offices for the eight years from 
1993-2001.  These were compiled by management and made available to the union as part of 
the consultation process.  Similar data were available for the late 1980s and early 1990s, but 
there is a break in the series owing to renegotiation of the performance management scheme 
in 1992-93, and a radical restructuring of the regional offices, so that the time series cannot 
be linked between the two periods.  In any case, the published data on targets for regional 
offices (administrative units) can only really be used from 1993.  From the text of the annual 
reports, it appears that the tax service used these indicators as part of its internal management 
process, and there are several cases in which new indicators especially of quality of service 
were published provisionally before being fully used to monitor performance.  The Annual 
Reports are published before Parliament, and scrutinised by the influential National Audit 
Office, which is responsible for monitoring the quality of public spending, and which has 
played a big part in diffusing new ideas on improved management across the public sector. 
  The tax service indicators are listed below, giving five quality and six clearance 
targets for the time period.  Some other indicators were not available for all years, and so 
could not be included in the time series.  As there was no obvious way to weight these, 
unweighted means were computed for the quality and clearance targets and their reported 
outcomes. 
 
Quality of Service  
•  Calculating tax correctly in every respect first time 
o  Schedule D (self employed) 37 
o  Schedule E (employees, excluding wholly by computer) 
•  Telephone calls answered within 30 seconds 
•  Personal callers seen within 15 minutes 
•  Repayment claims dealt with in < 28 days 
 
Clearance  
•  Correspondence dealt with in <28 days 
•  Clerical work (schedule E): % of taxpayers cleared by April 
•  Clearance: large cases (from previous years) 
•  Clearance: other cases (from previous years) 
•  Schedule D Self Assessment: returns processed by Sept 30th 
•  Collection: average monthly clearance (PAYE Band 1 assessed taxes) 
 
The outcomes reported were checked by the tax service’s internal auditor. 
  Indicators for the performance of the Employment Service were also published in its 
annual report and accounts to Parliament, and those for the NHS trust hospitals were 
published in the NHS Performance Guide. 
 
 
A.2  Measures of Key Variables from the Survey Data 
 
a)  Measures of employee performance:  validity and reliability 
 
The performance appraisal systems used, especially after the first of the tax service studies, 
drew heavily on the experience of outside consultants.  The systems used in the two hospitals 
were the Lloyd Masters system and Mediquate systems that are quite widely used in the 
health sector.  The scheme in the tax service that was in operation in 1996 had a substantial 
input from private consultants, and incorporated many ‘best practice’ ideas from the private 
sector and from the HR profession generally.  Indeed, even the scheme in operation at the 
time of the 1 991 survey met many of the criteria for good appraisal set out by the 
government’s Arbitration, Conciliation and Advisory Service, (ACAS, 1990).  Through the 
1980s and 1990s, the public sector made extensive use of private sector consultancy 
organisations.  The schemes contained a number of checks and balances, notably, except for 38 
head teachers, all line-manager appraisals were vetted by a higher level manager.  The overall 
distribution of appraisal scores was also made available to the unions, and was monitored by 
management to ensure the schemes were operated without bias and to protect them against an 
upward drift in performance ratings.  Measures of internal performance were also checked by 
the Audit Office which has overall responsibility for monitoring the quality of public 
spending.  All of these help to ensure the reliability of individual performance ratings.  Their 
validity, whether they represent actual performance, is a more difficult question, but as was 
shown in the main body of the article, the ‘leniency’ hypothesis proved less plausible than the 
‘productivity’ hypothesis. 
 
b)  Derivation of measures of perceived incentive and perceived divisiveness 
 
The variables measuring perceived incentive and perceived divisiveness were based on the 
questions shown in Table A2. 
 
Table A2:  Derivation of measures of perceived incentive and divisiveness by factor 
analysis 
  Factor 1: Perceived 
incentive 
Factor 2: perceived 
divisiveness 
PRP means good work is rewarded  .558  -.487 
PRP gives me an incentive to work beyond job 
requirements 
.888  -.111 
PRP gives me an incentive to take more initiative in my 
job 
.902  -3.963E-02 
PP causes jealousies/resentment  -6.312E-02  .770 
PRP Undermines teams  -.122  .776 
PRP has reduced my wish to cooperate with 
management 
-9.746E-02  .645 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotated Component Matrix, rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
c)  Derivation of the commitment variable 
 
Organisational commitment is measured by adapting the established scales based on Meyer 
and Allen (1997), and the factor weightings for each of the questions used are show in Table 
A 3.  Because this was cross-sectional survey, it was not possible to test whether commitment 
had the correct antecedents, but it was possible to test its correlates.  Meyer and Allen’s 
(1997) survey indicates a number of antecedents, most notably an employee’s length of 
service in an organisation.  Because professionals have a dual commitment, to their 
occupation and to their employing organisation  one would expect their organisational 39 
commitment to be less than that of other employees in jobs requiring organisation specific 
skills.  Gender roles might also cause women employees to display higher levels of 
commitment especially in service organisations because of the greater emphasis on 
interpersonal relations.  A simple regression showed that the measure of commitment 
increased strongly with length of service; it was lower among professionals than other 
occupations; and it was lower among males than females.  These three variables are useful 
because they are not affected by the operation of PRP and so barring any self-selection 
effects, can be construed to be independent. 
 
Table A3:  Factor analysis of commitment variables 
  Affective commitment  Goal commitment 
Working in the Org.  means a great deal to me  .805  .263 
I feel "part of the family" in my present 
office/hospital/school 
.750  -1.374E-02 
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with 
the org. 
.731  8.319E-02 
I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to the Inland Revenue  .714  .189 
Whenever changes made in this org employees usually lose 
out in the end 
-.387  -.103 
I think that I could easily become as attached to another 
organisation as I am to the Inland Revenue 
-.506  -2.050E-02 
By working in the Organisation, I feel that I am 
contributing to an important public service 
.313  .634 
Don't award PRP to retain staff  5.185E-02  -.869 
 
d)  Tests of the relationship between appraisal effectiveness and performance  
 
Further analysis of the relationship between the effectiveness of the appraisal process and 
performance is made possible by the more detailed descriptive questions relating to the 
conduct of appraisal in the two hospitals.  These can be used to check the validity of the more 
general questions on appraisal asked of all the organisations, and to check whether there are 
significant feedback effects from employees’ performance ratings onto their judgements of 
the appraisal process. 
  Two tests of the extent of such feedback effects were carried out. 
 
i )  Use of more descriptive questions on the appraisal process 
 
First, additional information from the two hospitals provides a number of more detailed, 
concrete, questions about the conduct of the appraisal process.  These had been asked because 40 
the HR managers who agreed access for the research were keen to know how well their 
appraisal schemes were working.  Generally, the more concrete the question, the less likely it 
is that replies will be coloured by other related events.  
  These more concrete questions were simplified by factor analysis into three 
components, consultation, supportiveness and clarity of the appraisal (Table A4), and the 
component scores then correlated with the measure of effective appraisal used in the article 
(Table A5). 
 
Table A4:  Factor analysis of appraisal quality (Trust-wide bonus hospital) 
  1 Consultation  2 Supportive  3 Clarity 
Throughout the last year, I had sufficient opportunity 
to discuss my performance with my line manager 
.895  -.193  .214 
In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity to 
discuss and clarify my role with my line manager 
.870  -.241  .215 
In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity to 
identify objectives and targets with my line manager 
.855  -.223  .248 
In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity to 
discuss my personal development needs with my line 
manager 
.843  -.258  .264 
I found the discussion irrelevant  -.219  .835  -.151 
I found the discussion superficial  -.218  .808  -.212 
I found the discussion threatening  -.120  .757  -.104 
I found the discussion useful  .318  -.679  .297 
I am clear about my current objectives and targets  .227  -.142  .870 
I am clear about my current job role  .151  -.145  .849 
I am clear about my personal development needs  .209  -.237  .637 
I understand my manager's rating of my performance  .425  -.222  .577 
Extraction Method:  Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method:  Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
Table A5:  Correlations of ‘effective appraisal’ with the factors based on detailed 
questions (Trust-wide bonus hospital) 
 
  Factor 1, Consultation  Factor 2, Supportive  Factor 3, Clarity 
Effective appraisal  .376**  -.244**  .747** 
N  367  367  367 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
ii )  Two-stage least squares test of the effect of effective appraisal on performance 
 
A second test was to use two-stage least squares, to test the model shown in Tables 2 and 3 in 
the main text, to see whether effective appraisal led to perceptions of incentive or 
divisiveness which, in turn, determined performance scores.  The two-stage least squares 41 
enables one to cut out the possible feedback from getting a good award onto perceptions of 
incentive and divisiveness. 
  As shown in Table A6, the standardised beta coefficients are quite large given the 
units of measurement, have the correct sign, and are strongly significant, and so confirm the 
influence of appraisal on performance, passing through perceived incentive and divisiveness. 
 
Table A6:  Estimated effects of perceived incentive and divisiveness on individual 
employee performance (two-stage least squares) 
Dependent variable:  Superior performance attained 
  Individual survey data   
Explanatory variable  Perceived incentive  Perceived divisiveness 
Multiple R  0.1749  .2213 
B  0.2298**  -0.3441** 
Beta  0.4828  -0.7138 
Sig  0.0000  0.0000 
N   2752  2725 
 
Notes:  
Individual employee data:  Instruments: effective appraisal; improved goal setting; being on the grade 
maximum, and lack of scope to improve. 
Note:  dummies were included for the Inland Revenue 1991 and 1996, but they made very little difference to the 
results. 
Significance: **, 2%; *, 5%. 
 
Thus, although neither of these tests is definitive on its own, they both suggest that feedback 
effects from performance awards onto judgements of effective appraisal, although no doubt 
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